On the second day of the 2BS Forum, during the panel “Cognitive Battlespaces: Rethinking Strategic Communication and Resilience in a Multi-Vector Environment,” experts from Ukraine, Sweden, Montenegro, and the United Kingdom warned that in the era of multilayered conflicts, victory depends not only on military capabilities but also on the ability of states to communicate effectively, preserve social unity, and build citizens’ trust in institutions.
Milan Jovanović, Senior Analyst at Debunk.org, warned that the biggest challenge for Montenegro in facing modern hybrid threats is the lack of unity within institutions and society, as well as the strong political and social influence of external actors, especially through religious structures.
“One of the key messages we heard at this forum, both yesterday and today, especially from Ukraine’s experience, is that better defense against modern threats requires unity — unity of institutions and society. Unfortunately, when it comes to Montenegro, I fear this unity is lacking,” said Jovanović.
He emphasized that there is no consensus in Montenegro even on basic issues, let alone foreign policy priorities. “When I say ‘we,’ I mean both the citizens and the political elites currently leading the country. Polarization is so deep that it hinders any joint action in confronting threats,” he warned.
Speaking about hybrid threats, Jovanović noted that their intensity in Montenegro increased after the country joined NATO and has been further amplified in recent years due to its rapprochement with the European Union. “This is not a new issue, but in the last five to six years, we have observed a significant intensification of malign actors’ activities,” he added.
As the most direct channel of external influence, Jovanović identified the religious factor, particularly the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) in Montenegro.
“This is especially dangerous because it is an institution that enjoys the highest level of trust among citizens. It acts as a kind of umbrella organization that brings together various actors and has been actively involved in political life for years. We have seen this since 2020 and even earlier,” he stressed.
Jovanović warned that it is hard to imagine strong institutions and a unified defense of the country while, as he said, the main political actors are deeply divided and some have close ties with authoritarian structures in Russia and Serbia.
“We have political leaders in the country accused of attempting a coup in 2016 who are now in power. This leaves room for continued external influence aimed at distancing Montenegro from its European path,” Jovanović said.
Alen Musaefendić, Senior Analyst at the Swedish Psychological Defense Agency, said that Sweden’s accession to NATO seemed like a quick and easy process to many, but behind that decision lies a decades-long, often polarizing debate.
“I understand it may look smooth from the outside, but I assure you it was not. This debate has been ongoing since the 1950s,” Musaefendić said.
He reminded that Sweden has had a long tradition of neutrality and last fought a war in 1814 against Norway. “Since then, we have enjoyed over 200 years of peace. Peace combined with neutrality has shaped our identity. Swedes see themselves as peacekeepers, diplomats, those who do not pick sides or participate in wars,” he emphasized.
Such an identity, Musaefendić added, made the question of NATO membership highly political and polarizing. “Traditionally, those in favor of NATO membership came from the right political spectrum, while those against mostly from the left. It was a historic moment when the decision was finally made,” he said.
Musaefendić highlighted that the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was the key turning point.
“As ironically noted by Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama, we owe all this to Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. He reversed decades of debate. Especially social democrats, who long criticized NATO, admitted that the time had come to abandon neutrality and choose a side,” Musaefendić explained.
Speaking about how Sweden managed to explain the need for NATO membership to its citizens, Musaefendić said the strategy was based on “brutal honesty.”
“We lived under the illusion that we did not pick sides, but the truth is we relied on the implicit expectation that the United States and NATO would come to our aid if needed. We had already cooperated with NATO for years, so it was just formalizing the relationship,” he said.
“The message from the right was: let’s do this. From the left, it was: we do this reluctantly, but we must. You can criticize this approach as half-hearted, but it is extremely powerful when an experienced politician publicly says: it hurts me that we do this, but we have no choice,” he added.
When asked to compare the processes in Sweden and Montenegro and Russian interference in them, Musaefendić said that “NATO accession today almost follows a predictable pattern.”
“Russian disruptions, information manipulation, hybrid actions are expected. They do not just attack the state joining NATO but use every narrative, every crack, and every social tension to their advantage,” Musaefendić emphasized.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked a turning point in understanding how modern war is waged in the information age, said Kyrylo Viktorov, Head of the Department for Countering Information Threats to National Security at the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation.
“If we only act reactively, we will always lag behind the enemy. In a war where information spreads in seconds, slowness means defeat,” Viktorov stressed, presenting several key lessons Ukraine has learned and incorporated into its multilayered defense strategy.
According to him, these lessons have changed how Ukraine protects the state, not only on the battlefield but also in the consciousness of citizens, both domestically and beyond its borders.
Viktorov recalled that at the start of Russian aggression in 2014, Ukraine’s information defense was mostly informal.
“Volunteers, journalists, and civil society organizations did enormous work, but without sufficient resources and institutional support. Their work was heroic but insufficient compared to the state apparatus of Russian propaganda, which operated systematically and continuously,” he said.
A key change happened in 2021, when, by decision of President Volodymyr Zelensky and the National Security and Defense Council, the Center for Combating Disinformation was established. That year Ukraine modernized its security architecture by adopting the Information Security Strategy and the Cybersecurity Strategy.
“This confirmed that information security is a matter of national survival, not just part of media culture. Since then, we have moved from improvised reactions to a coordinated state policy,” Viktorov said.
Yasmine Hafiz, Chief of Communications Officer for North America and Security at the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, said that citizens’ trust in institutions and the authorities’ ability to communicate clearly and purposefully with the public are fundamental prerequisites for effectively combating disinformation and crises.
Hafiz emphasized that low public trust in institutions is one of the biggest obstacles to effective communication.
“Governments worldwide, including in the UK, face a credibility deficit. Citizens often do not trust official institutions, which makes fighting disinformation, especially from far-right extremist sources, very difficult,” she said.
Hafiz recalled experiences from the COVID-19 pandemic when the UK government had to communicate key public health messages and economic support measures.
“During the pandemic, we desperately tried to reach citizens with crucial public health messages and support measures for the economy, as the crisis had enormous economic impact. We faced disinformation that further undermined trust in institutions and complicated decision-making,” Hafiz stressed.
Speaking about the principles of strategic communication, Hafiz emphasized that the most important thing is to clearly define the target audience and what the institutions want to achieve.
“We must be extremely clear about who our audience is and what we want them to think, feel, and do. If we want behavioral change, we need to understand citizens’ demographic characteristics, whom they trust, which institutions they have confidence in, and where they seek information. If we don’t know this, we are practically talking to an empty room,” she said.
She added that it is equally important to have clearly defined goals. “The public health example shows that it is not enough to just seek higher vaccination rates—we need to understand if there are barriers to remove before we start motivating people.”